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The remarkable social impact and economic success 
of the Internet is in many ways directly attributable 
to the architectural characteristics that were part of 
its design.  The Internet was designed with no 
gatekeepers over new content or services. 
                                                         —Vinton Cerf 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a new age of global communications.  This 
technological age is now threatened by exaggerations that arise 
from fear of the unknown.  What once was a free frontier of 
discovery has now become a source of contention.  Governments 
around the world have continued to push toward greater 
surveillance in what should be an area of accessible knowledge.  
This recent governmental approach vis-à-vis the Internet is not 
only misguided, but also contrary to the values that supposedly 
guide democratic nations.  This Article does not deny that threats 
exist in cyberspace, but it warns against fear-based actions that 
would encroach on the rights that human beings cherish.  In 
particular, this Article observes that the regulation of the Internet 
must be aimed at the development of a cyberspace protected by 
governments, which must also maintain access to information for 
their citizens in light of a “world public order of human dignity,” 
“one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings 
to all things they cherish.”2 
It is not irrelevant to point out that the Internet continues to be 
a vast frontier of information.  The idea that it can be divided by 
virtual borders disregards the network’s purpose and its value to 
society.  “The benefits of the open and accessible Internet are 
nearly incalculable and their loss would wreak significant social 
and economic damage.”3  The Internet is of great significance at 
the international level because humanity has learned to appreciate 
the benefits of this technology, while also noticing the political 
challenges attached to it. 
The nature of Cyberspace rests in its effective malleability, 
conceived of by the scientists and academics around the world that 
worked on its creation and made the decision to encourage the 
 
 2 See W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New 
Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575, 576 (2007) (defining 
“public order of human dignity” when discussing the New Haven School). 
 3 Vinton Cerf, Keep the Internet Open, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2012), http://www.ny 
times.com/2012/05/25/opinion/keep-the-internet-open.html. 
C04_KULESZA_BALLESTE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2013  1:26 PM 
2013] JUS INTERNET 1313 
constant evolution of this medium.4  Today, having sufficient 
access to the Internet’s information has arguably become a 
prerequisite for the enjoyment of human life.  The Internet has 
become a center for human literacy and has the potential to offer 
numerous kinds of instruction at lower costs and with higher 
quality than previous media could offer.5 
This Article will argue that the concept of a “cybered 
Westphalian age,”6 as a cure to all threats in the Internet, has the 
potential to do more harm than good.  The international 
community is now faced with a possible policy shift from the 
current state of the Internet, which is one of shared knowledge, 
toward the active practice of censorship and filtered content, which 
will have devastating consequences. 
The matter of alternative approaches to Internet regulation and 
the values surrounding human dignity brings the discussion back to 
the original consideration: the rights that human beings cherish.  
As has happened before in human history, when considering the 
benefits and threats found on the Internet, we are reminded that 
behind every new technology lurks someone’s desire to exert 
control over it.  Debates pertaining to the Internet, such as issues of 
personal privacy, equality of access, censorship, and computer 
crimes, center on the larger issue of control.  There are no longer 
any doubts about the fact that whoever controls the Internet also 
controls access to information.   
To see the Internet as something that must be controlled at any 
cost is self-defeating.  Although there is a need for security 
measures in cyberspace, security ought to be achieved with due 
regard to the network’s architecture and without destroying the 
openness obtained by the creators of the Internet.7  Even though a 
 
 4 See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE 
(2006) (telling the story of the inventors of the Internet). 
 5 See Frances Cairncross & Kaija Pöysti, ICTs for Education and Building Human 
Capital, in VISIONS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Lara Srivastava ed.), available at  
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/visions/education/index.html (stating that many educators see 
the role of information and communications technologies as delivering a higher quality 
education at a lower cost). 
 6 See Chris C. Demchak & Peter Dombrowski, Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age, 
STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, at 32, 32, 36–39. 
 7 See generally HAFNER & LYON, supra note 4. 
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growing number of nation-states are introducing content filtering,8 
excessive censorship of online content should not be seen as an 
exemplary practice now or in the future.  The Internet has changed 
human history forever, and this technological marvel has brought 
challenges to recognized fundamental freedoms, the meaning of 
ethics, and human dignity.9  Governments should not define their 
priorities based solely on the risks associated with cybercrime.  
Doing so would inevitably lead to a “fenced” cyberspace,10 while 
ignoring the resulting harms of unequal access to information and 
undue surveillance. 
This Article also argues that the historical importance of freely 
accessing information and the Roman legal concept of jus gentium 
may be used as signposts for the further development of 
cyberspace regulation.  Instead of a “Westphalian” cyberspace 
order, an alternative regime is presented, one also originating from 
the core of international law but rooted in ancient times, rather than 
the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment. 
The international law theory of jus gentium originated with the 
ancient Roman legal system, and it is based on the understanding 
that legal relationships and institutions are governed by a law 
common to all humanity.11  This legal theory was revisited by legal 
scholars, who began to recognize the significance of the idea of 
“common good for the international legal order,” particularly 
because this idea conceived of humanity as “a moral and political 
 
 8 See Robert Faris & Nart Villeneuve, Measuring Global Internet Filtering, in 
ACCESS DENIED 5, 5 (Ronald Deibert, e.t. al. eds., 2008) (finding twenty-six of forty 
countries surveyed employed filtering and expecting that number to rise); see also 
ROBERT DEIBERT et al., ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND 
RULE IN CYBERSPACE 3–15 (Ronald Deibert e.t. al. eds., 2010) (discussing the evolving 
scale of Internet filtering). 
 9 Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, Foreword to DIVINA FRAU-MEIGS, MEDIA MATTERS IN 
THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY—TOWARDS A HUMAN 
RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE 5, 5 (2011). 
 10 See Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32–35 (discussing the “fencing” of 
cyberspace in response to threats such as cybercrime). 
 11 1 R. W. DYSON, NATURAL LAW AND POLITICAL REALISM IN THE HISTORY OF 
POLITICAL THOUGHT, 127–28 (2005); see also DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN ANTIQUITY 84–85 (2004). 
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entity, deducing therefrom certain basic obligations for States.”12  
By 1749, it was argued that nation-states, bound together by 
nature, were required to maintain said bond.13  The theologian St. 
Thomas Aquinas had identified Divine law within humanity, 
explaining that natural law represented how humanity took part of 
Divine Law.14  As a result, St. Thomas Aquinas would have seen 
this bond among nation-states assured by Divine law.  Hugo 
Grotius had already written about the law of all nations and its 
innate characteristic in every individual.15  Grotius explained the 
law of all nations as the “law derived from nature, the common 
mother of us all, whose bounty falls on all, and whose sway 
extends over those who rule nations, and which is held most sacred 
by those who are most scrupulously just.”16  He inferred a 
characteristic of stewardship required of nations acting in trust for 
all humanity.  Other writers moved their discussion to the human 
individual’s rights and duties within the nation-state, and by 1754 
jus gentium was also considered a “harmonizing process” between 
individuals and nation-states, providing a system of values in 
which peace was needed for their natural coexistence.17 
Attempts to normalize the concept of a quasi-territorial 
delimitation of cyberspace will produce adverse results.  A 
stronger case can be made that no territorially-based regime may 
be successfully applied to an aterritorial cyberspace.18  
Transboundary accord, based on the cultural common ground 
central to ancient legal and social philosophy, is better than a 
 
 12 Juliane Kokott & Frank Hoffmeister, International Public Order, in THE MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 2 (Heidelberg and Oxford 
Univ. Press 2013). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 91, art. 2–5 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947). 
 15 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 5 (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph 
Van Deman Magoffin, Oxford University Press 1916). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Stephan Verosta, History of International Law, 1648 to 1815, in THE MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 62 (Heidelberg and Oxford Univ. Press 
2013). 
 18 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367–76 (1996). 
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territorial regime for governance of the global phenomenon that is 
cyberspace. 
There are noted national cyber-security interests that provoke 
the idea of reflecting the territorial mechanism of national self-
defense within the “fifth battlefield” that is cyberspace in exactly 
the same way as in the other four fields of state confrontation.19  
But current international law analysis leaves much doubt as to the 
recognition of “digital territory” as an element of a state’s national 
territory.20  Such analysis makes it difficult to recognize most 
cyber-threats as attacks upon a state’s territory, which would allow 
for self-defense and, what is more, the application of the 
appropriate law of war (jus ad bellum) mechanisms.21  As a 
remedy, numerous legal scholars are attempting to introduce a 
plausible analogy that would apply territorially-based international 
law to aterritorial cyberspace.22  One such recent attempt relies 
upon a direct analogy to one of the pillars of modern international 
law—the Westphalian order, which served as the stepping-stone 
for contemporary international law.23 
I. ORIGINS OF THE SOVEREIGN NATION-STATES REGIME 
All wars, whether in land, air, sea or cyberspace, spell certain 
doom.  The era of the old kingdoms began its end on May 23, 1618 
when Protestants from Bohemia threw two imperial governors 
from the window of the castle in Prague.24  This marked the 
beginning of the Thirty Years’ War.25  This war, which involved 
both the Catholics and the Protestants, was a reflection of religious 
 
 19 See Victoria Ekstedt, Is the Swedish Territorial Defence Ordinance Applicable on 
the Fourth Arena?, in 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 61, 61–68 
(C. Czosseck, Ė. Tyugu & T. Wingfield eds. 2011), available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/ 
publications/2011proceedings/2011_Proceedings.pdf. 
 20 Id. at 65–66. 
 21 But see Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited: U.S. Security Strategy 
and the Jus ad Bellum, 176 MIL. L. REV. 364, 415–20 (2003) (extending existing 
understandings of the application of jus ad bellum to cyber war). 
 22 See, e.g., Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32–35. 
 23 Id. 
 24 GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 48–49 (1987); C. V. WEDGWOOD, THE 
THIRTY YEARS WAR 12, 78–79 (1939). 
 25 WEDGWOOD, supra note 24, at 12. 
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fanaticism and the ambitions of rulers.26  The war involved kings, 
queens, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope.27  The butchery 
and savagery of the Thirty Years’ War were catastrophic and 
brought total misery, disease, famine, forced migration, devastated 
economies, and deaths that reduced the population of central 
Europe by one third.28  The war (1618–1648) ended when 
European rulers agreed to a diplomatic solution.29  It was in the 
year 1648 that a solution materialized with a series of treaties 
known as the Peace of Westphalia.30  The peace process began in 
1644 by representatives of nearly two hundred Catholic and 
Protestant rulers, camped in Münster and Osnabrück, in the 
northwestern German region of Westphalia.31  The series of 
treaties, signed in Münster and Osnabrück, relied on a simple idea.  
Within the forum of a first ever diplomatic conference, sovereigns 
who had been fighting for three decades decided to recognize each 
other as equals, with equal rights and obligations resting upon each 
of them.32  Thus the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty was 
born. 
Most heads of states (i.e., sovereigns) agreed to govern the 
communities they led within certain territorial boundaries, as 
agreed upon in 1648.33  Crucial for this accord was the issue of 
cultural values, as reflected in the religious beliefs underlying each 
of the communities.  Protestants and Catholics were deemed equal, 
while Calvinism was legally recognized.  In order to allow this 
peaceful coexistence to happen, the concept of “sovereign states” 
 
 26 CARL SAGAN, COSMOS 51 (Ballantine Books 1985) (1980). 
 27 1 THOMAS A. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 147–48 (1899). 
 28 STROBE TALBOTT, THE GREAT EXPERIMENT: THE STORY OF ANCIENT EMPIRES, 
MODERN STATES, AND THE QUEST FOR A GLOBAL NATION 86 (2009). 
 29 Id. at 86–87. 
 30 WALKER, supra note 27, at 145–48. 
 31 TALBOTT, supra note 28 at 86. 
 32 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 21–22, 40 
(1948). 
 33 Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20 Int’l Security 115, 115 (1995); 
see also Jouni Häkli, The Politics of Belonging: Complexities of Identity in the Catalan 
Borderlands, 83 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER B : HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 111, 112 (2001) (noting 
that it took France and Spain 11 more years to find a satisfying consensus, embodied 
within the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659). 
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was introduced.34  The Westphalian accord allowed communities 
to be governed in accordance with the common interest of the 
state, understood as one separate and superior to those of the 
sovereign, the king or the community itself.35  This idea was well 
reflected by the term “raison d’état” (national interest),36 which 
sought, in part, to protect the overall interests of, say, the French 
state rather than those of the king or of the Catholic Church by 
finding “a mean between what conscience permits and affairs 
require.”37  Thus, state sovereignty meant that the nation-state 
interest, rather than religious or personal motives, was to be the 
guiding principle of all international relations.38 
The Westphalian concept of sovereign states later developed 
into the sovereignty of “nation-states,” laying the foundation for 
contemporary international relations.  “Nation states” would be 
identified as communities formed by individuals with joint values, 
history and culture rather than solely by a single sovereign’s 
exercise of power over a group of individuals, as was the case with 
“sovereign states.”39  The idea of “sovereign nation states,” derived 
from the Westphalian order, required nation-states to coexist 
peacefully through allowing each community to exercise its 
common culture and beliefs, communicate in common languages 
and govern themselves in a way they found appropriate within 
certain territorial limits, as agreed upon by the nation-states.40  It 
must be noted that the current evolution of international relations 
has led several political and legal writers to conclude that we are 
 
 34 See Juliane Kokott, States, Sovereign Equality, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 6 (Heidelberg and Oxford Univ. Press 2013). 
 35 See W. ANDY KNIGHT, A CHANGING UNITED NATIONS: MULTILATERAL EVOLUTION 
AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 75–77 (2000). See generally Peace Treaty 
between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies, the 
Avalon Project, Yale Law School, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ 
westphal.asp. 
 36 See generally W.F. CHURCH, RICHELIEU AND REASON OF STATE (1973) (discussing 
the history and application of “raison d’état”). 
 37 Id. at 168 (quoting Silhon). 
 38 See id at 171. 
 39 See J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms 
and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 107, 110 (1994). 
 40 See id. at 115–17. 
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experiencing the dusk of the Westphalian order.41  Globalization 
and new media, as enabled primarily through the popularization of 
the global network, bringing instantaneous communication 
worldwide and promoting similar commercial and social trends all 
over the globe, clearly lead to the conclusion that a rigid 
Westphalian distinction among nations, communities and societies 
is no longer legitimate nor executable.42  “Sovereignty”—a term 
crucial to the architecture of the Westphalian regime—is being 
substituted by its derivatives, such as “shared sovereignty,” and 
amended to a much narrower scope with such international law 
instruments as peremptory norms or humanitarian intervention.43  
Therefore its re-introduction for the cyber-sphere seems 
particularly ill-suited. 
II. ATERRITORIAL CYBERSPACE VS. WESTPHALIAN ORDER 
The proposed legal concept of the “cybered Westphalian age” 
for the Internet is based on the perception that “no frontier lasts 
forever, and no freely occupied global commons extends endlessly 
where human societies are involved.”44  This concept is flawed for 
two main reasons: the analogy utilized is inaccurate, and its legal 
analysis is incomplete.  The suggestion that a frontier must be 
subject to a limitative unit of measurement is a legacy of the old 
order of Westphalia.  In our day and age, there are new frontiers 
that can be established and others that will never be crossed.  For 
example, this “frontier” analogy cannot be easily applied to outer 
 
 41 See James A. Caporaso, Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public 
Authority, and Sovereignty, 2 INT’L STUD. REV., 1 (2000); Mark Purcell, Citizenship and 
the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order, 27 INT’L J. URB. & 
REG’L RESEARCH 564, 571 (2003); John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 139–40 (1993). 
 42 See generally Steven Wheatley, Democratic Governance Beyond the State: The 
Legitimacy of Non-State Actors as Standard Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS 
STANDARD SETTERS 218 (2009) (explaining that in the realm of traditional sovereign law-
making, international governance by non-state actors stands outside the Westphalian 
order). . 
 43 See Stephen D. Krasner, The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70 
(2005); Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, 
and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2004). 
 44 Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32. 
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space.45  Science has shown that the frontier of an infinite Universe 
may continue without end.46  Indeed, the fact that we measure 
distances in outer space in billions of light years dwarfs any notion 
of a frontier, such as the American frontier, with recognized 
geographical limits.  Similarly, any comparison of the Internet to 
the American frontier, as has been suggested,47 would be too 
simplistic.  On the other hand, the “cybered Westphalian age” 
proposition, as defined within the legal context of a frontier, is 
based on the idea that “good fences are erected to make good 
neighbors,” even in cyberspace.48  This premise ignores the value 
of the “global commons” recognized by legally designating regions 
of valuable resources as protected for the enjoyment of all 
peoples.49  Outer space is an example.50  Any model of governance 
designed to place national borders within the Internet only 
considers the practical aspects of governance, focuses too narrowly 
on the short-term, and fails to resolve the long-term conflict.  
While it is much easier to accept the benefits of “placing fences,” 
the ultimate goal should be a promotion of the principles enshrined 
in natural law that direct governments to carefully study the 
benefits owed to humanity. 
The ultimate benefits for humanity are clearly delineated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.51  This declaration asserts 
that a new respect is needed to promote greater opportunities for 
humanity, by reshaping the classical nation-state sovereignty and 
focusing on developing a global society.52  While the Internet must 
be understood as operating within the realities of our present legal 
world, existing positive laws must be formulated in accordance 
 
 45 Cf. FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 164–65 (2009) 
(discussing the absurdity of having state sovereignty extend infinitely into space, pointing 
out the difficulty in establishing a border, and questioning whether a border is necessary). 
 46 See generally ARCHIVES OF THE UNIVERSE (MARCIA BARTUSIAK ed., 2004). 
 47 See, e.g., DOROTHY E. DENNING & PETER J. DENNING, INTERNET BESIEGED, at vii 
(1997). 
 48 Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32. 
 49 See SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 1–2 (1998). 
 50 Id. at 1. 
 51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 52 Id. 
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with the ultimate benefit to humanity.53  New laws are needed to 
promote greater opportunities for humanity, by stepping away 
from classical nation-state sovereignty and looking at developing a 
global public trust.54 
Cyber attacks open up the nation-state to questions of state 
responsibility in international human rights law.  The “cybered 
Westphalian age” proposition argues that cyberspace is 
experiencing the beginnings of an international “border-making 
process.”55  The fact that the Internet has experienced increased 
government activity seeking to “control access” or exert 
censorship, depending on the circumstances, including a rise of 
Internet filtering, does not necessarily reflect a positive exercise of 
sovereignty over the virtual world.56  Government responses to 
cyber-attacks require a careful understanding of the attribution 
element and constant recognition that the Internet is a peaceful 
instrument of global communications.57 
As the right to free expression is not imposed through a 
peremptory norm, restrictions thereto should only be introduced 
within the limits set out by international law.  The U.N. Human 
Rights Council Resolution 12/1658 on freedom of opinion and 
expression prohibits States Parties from imposing restrictions on 
the right to access and use information on the Internet.  
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that actively protecting the 
right to free speech online might be somewhat of a challenge.  The 
current procedures (international complaints procedure and special 
procedures) created within the United Nations for the protection of 
human rights are initiated in principle by the Human Rights 
 
 53 KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1998). 
 54 Id. at 371. 
 55 Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32. 
 56 Id at 47. 
 57 See Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for 
Operating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L. REV. 167, 205–06 
(2012) (discussing what the author calls the “sixth element strategic initiative” and the 
importance of attributing a cyber-attack correctly). 
 58 Human Rights Council Res. 12/16, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, 
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development, 12th Sess., Oct. 12, 2009, U.N. GAOR, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 5(p)(iii) (Oct. 
12, 2009). 
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Council, which currently is dominated by African and Islamic 
countries,59 which are often supported by Russia and China,60 both 
of which restrict freedom of speech.  In this context, the chance of 
obtaining international sanctioning authority for actions against 
extensive censorship practices appears slim.  Without such 
authorization, any action aimed at those extensively limiting 
freedom of speech online would be deemed inconsistent with 
international law. 
At the same time, one can identify a growing accord that 
excessive filtering is contrary to the globally agreed free speech 
standard, as per Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,61 and discussions are being initiated to identify the details 
of that standard for the online environment.  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”62 is the point 
of departure for Internet governance (IG).  For example, the U.N. 
Human Rights Council’s resolution on promotion, protection and 
enjoyment of human rights on the Internet was based, in part, on 
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63  
Further, during the 2007 Internet Governance Forum in Brazil, the 
Council of Europe noted that “[f]reedom of expression and 
security on the Internet are not contradictory but complementing 
values in the information society.”64 
Proponents of a cybered Westphalian age argue, “As 
cyberspace is profoundly man-made, no impossible barriers hinder 
 
 59 Robert Evans, U.N. Chief Tells Rights Body Drop Rhetoric, Blocs, REUTERS 
(Dec. 12, 2008, 2:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/12/us-un-rights-
idUSTRE4BB67820081212; see also Membership of the Human Rights Council, OFFICE 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Membership.aspx (last visited May 10, 
2013) (listing the council’s current membership). 
 60 Evans, supra note 59. 
 61 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 51, art. 19. 
 62 Id. art. 1. 
 63 Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of 
Human Rights on the Internet, 20th Sess., June 29, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (July 
7, 2012). 
 64 Freedom of Expression and Security on the Internet, UNESCO (Nov. 14, 2007), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/freedom_of_expression 
_and_security_on_the_internet-2. 
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the growth of national borders in cyberspace.  They are possible 
technologically, comfortable psychologically, and manageable 
systematically and politically.”65  In spite of this, the recent report 
from the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, contended that 
the Internet is key to the exercising of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, as guaranteed by article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).66  The ICCPR states that the right to 
freedom of expression includes the freedom to receive and impart 
information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any media 
of choice.67  Human Rights Committee General Comment 10 has 
emphasized the obligation of nations to protect the right to freedom 
of expression, which includes freedom to “impart information and 
ideas of all kinds,” and the freedom to seek and receive them 
regardless of frontiers and the medium utilized.68  A common 
understanding ought to be developed that filtering or privacy-
limiting measures should be limited as potential violations of 
human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression in the 
cyber-world.69  It must be acknowledged that the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression functions as an “enabler” of other rights, 
 
 65 Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 35. 
 66 See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Key Trends and Challenges to the Right of all Individuals to 
Seek, Receive and Impart Information and Ideas of all Kinds Through the Internet, 
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Report on 
Internet Freedom] (by Frank La Rue). 
 67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 
19(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 68 U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 10: Freedom of 
Expression (Art. 19), 19th Sess. (June 29, 1983), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ 
doc.nsf/0/2bb2f14bf558182ac12563ed0048df17. 
 69 The right to access information is an essential element of the right to free speech.  
According to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right of free 
expression consists of three constitutive elements: 1) the freedom to hold opinions 
without interference, 2) the right to receive information and ideas expressed by others and 
3) the right to impart information and ideas. See supra note 51, art. 19.  Freedom of 
speech, in all these respects, can be exercised, according to the cited document, through 
“any media and regardless of frontiers.” Id.  In the same way the freedom of speech is 
defined in hard documents of international law (i.e., Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Report on Internet Freedom, supra 66, ¶ 20. 
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including the right to education necessary for the enjoyment of the 
benefits of scientific progress, as well as civil and political rights.70 
To recognize the changing nature of the Internet, the Cybered 
Westphalian proponents chose the crossing of the Rubicon as a 
metaphor evoking Julius Caesar’s famous river crossing on his 
way to Rome from Gaul.71  For the proponents, the phrase 
“crossing the Rubicon” seems to mean a new historical landmark, 
and one pointing toward warfare.72  The political landscape of the 
Roman Republic certainly changed after Julius Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon River with his army in 49 BCE.73  The Cybered 
Westphalian proponents noted a change in the landscape of the 
Internet and compared it with the story of the Stuxnet worm attack, 
branded as the “modern” Rubicon.74  But if the crossing of the 
Rubicon must be the metaphor, then the Stuxnet worm is not the 
other landmark that we must embrace.  Certainly, the Stuxnet 
technological sophistication, although memorable, dwarfs in 
comparison with the events in Italy that would define human 
history for at least five hundred years.75  But it is rather by opening 
the Internet forever that humanity will cross the Rubicon, by 
making the hard choices that will define our global civilization. 
While the past reflects an image of a Westphalian model of 
multilateralism where the nation-state has enjoyed a privileged and 
unquestioned position, the present reminds of a rising model of 
governance—multistakeholderism.  Multistakeholder systems take 
a step back and seek to improve an atmosphere of endless military 
conflicts, lack of educational opportunities, the disregard for 
human innovation, censorship, and other threats such as spam, 
phishing and DDoS attacks.  These threats have damaged 
somewhat the credibility of the Internet as a platform for human 
development and have called into question governments’ ability to 
protect the citizens they claim to protect. 
 
 70  Report on Internet Freedom, supra note 66, ¶ 22. 
 71 H. H. SCULLARD, FROM THE GRACCHI TO NERO: A HISTORY OF ROME FROM 133 B.C. 
TO A.D. 68, 121–22, 134–35 (2007). 
 72 Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32. 
 73 SCULLARD, supra note 71, at 121–22. 
 74 Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32. 
 75 SCULLARD, supra note 71, at 121–23. 
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The future, however, offers humanity a multistakeholder order 
rising to face new challenges and to open new opportunities.  It is 
here that cyberspace encounters the reality of a new landscape in 
international law, requiring that as a process of decision and 
participation, not only nation-states, but now a much wider range 
of actors should require consideration.76  Legal multistakeholder 
actors77 exist as participants stemming from the analysis based on 
past decisions, while attempting to participate in the course of 
future decisions.78  If history is to be utilized as a cyberspace 
analogy, then we must look toward ancient times for illumination.  
It was the Roman Empire that offered the world the foundations of 
the contemporary international legal regime, jus gentium (later 
developed into the law of the nations).79 
III. CYBERSPACE AS A REGULATORY CHALLENGE 
The wave of demonstrations in countries across the Middle 
East and North Africa in 2011 showed that the Internet now plays a 
mobilizing role in the population regarding “justice, equality, 
accountability and better respect for human rights.”80  It is here that 
we face the reality of a renewed international dimension where a 
much wider range of actors now have a voice within the decision-
 
 76 Id at 19 (Those actors “included national and international officials, the elites of 
non-governmental organizations running the gamut from those concerned with wealth 
through to those concerned with religious rectitude, transnational business entities, gangs 
and terrorists, and individuals.”). 
 77 The stakeholders represent the participants or actors in the Internet governance 
debate: governments, private sector, civil society, United Nations family agencies, and 
international organizations (NGOs). 
 78 See W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International 
Law-Making Process and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 15–19 (Rüdiguer Wolfrum & Volker Röben, 
eds. 2005). 
 79 See MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–44 (1987) (on jus 
naturale genesis). See generally Stanislas F. Belch, Paulus Vladimiri and his Doctrine 
Concerning International Law and Politics, 176 REVUE DE L’HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS 225 
(1969); LUDWIK EHRLICH, WORKS OF PAUL WLADIMIRI (1969); Mark Goldie, Edmund 
Bohun and Ius Gentium in the Revolution Debate, 1689–1693, 20 THE HIST. J. 569 
(1977). 
 80 Report on Internet Freedom, supra note 66, ¶ 2. 
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making process.81  The legal power of the individual, enhanced by 
new communication technologies, has created the opportunity for 
meaningful individual participation in key aspects of international 
decisions, even where these individuals are not affiliated with 
governments.82  By focusing on the “nation-state,” the Cybered 
Westphalian approach is less likely to appreciate and more likely 
to interfere with the roles that are played by individuals and groups 
in the formation and continuation of the Internet governance 
process.  Governments should avoid isolation and must strive for 
an international consensus of joint cooperation for the benefit of 
the “citizens” of the Internet.  Governments must accept that the 
Internet is not a source in itself of “moral decline.”83  The main 
contours of contemporary societal confusion are based on “fears, 
which take form in dystopian rhetorics,” bringing about moral 
panic “in which anxieties over uncontrollable social forces become 
the focus of efforts to understand a new cultural trend.”84  Indeed, 
good arguments support the view that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights has had a constitutional quality ab initio.85  Human 
rights concepts may be identified within the Internet as a cultural 
necessity of progression toward a common good, and one that 
seeks out strategies to balance the weight of power while 
identifying greater degrees of participation within the decision-
making process for all “citizens” of the Internet: the netizens.86  As 
a result, the fraught relationship between national sovereignty 
interests and common practices of cyber-communities deserves to 
be analyzed through the prism of international law before the 
predictions of a cybered Internet can be fully validated.  Therefore, 
it is the nation-state that ultimately must prove its legitimacy as the 
good steward and protector of the most interesting and sustained 
grand development of inspiration: the international law of the 
 
 81 See Reisman, supra note 78, at 19. 
 82 See Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 2. 
 83 See NANCY K. BAYM, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 41–44 (2010). 
 84 Id. at 41, 43. 
 85 See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287, 289–290 (1996). 
 86 The term introduced by Michael Hauben to describe an active participant of the 
global electronic exchange. See MICHAEL HAUBEN & RONDA HAUBEN, NETIZENS: ON THE 
HISTORY AND IMPACT OF USENET AND THE INTERNET (1997). 
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Internet.  This law, one that must, as has been discussed, 
incorporate human dignity, “is surely inseparable from the 
question of what it is to be human.”87 
The netizen, it could be argued, exists in an environment that 
has witnessed the evolution of rules that continue to limit the old 
Westphalian order.  To broaden the basis of the decision-making 
process within the Internet requires that netizens be given 
uninhibited control over their roles according to their 
responsibilities within the world community.  Thus, the practical 
aspect of any new regime needs to be based on established legal 
practices of international relations that enshrine human dignity. 
These factors, as well as the sui generis aspects of the Internet, 
were considered in the 1997 United States Supreme Court case of 
Reno v.  ACLU, where the Court recognized the distinctiveness of 
the Internet as a structure that provides “a wide variety of 
communication and information retrieval methods.”88  The Court 
noted that all of these methods, taken as a whole, constituted a 
unique medium, known to its users as cyberspace, and “located in 
no particular geographical location but available to anyone, 
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”89  Two years 
later, the concept of cyberspace as a community was explored.90  
In this environment of netizens, cooperation has produced public 
goods that benefit the collective.91  This new cyber-person, the 
netizen, has been represented by all stakeholder groups.92  This 
cyber-environment acquired a new identity after the 2003 first 
phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, under the 
name of “the Information Society.”93  This environment is one of 
 
 87 See Jeff Malpas, Human Dignity and Human Being, in PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN 
DIGNITY 19 (2007). 
 88 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997). 
 89 Id at 851, 117 S. Ct. at 2334–35. 
 90 See Marc Smith & Peter Kollock, Communities in Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN 
CYBERSPACE 16–18, (Marc Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999). 
 91 Peter Kollock, The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in 
Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 225–31, (Marc Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 
1999). 
 92 See Rolf Weber, Accountability in Internet Governance, 13 Int’l J. Comm. L. & 
Pol’y 152, 159 (2009). 
 93 Id. 
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unique properties and unique social relationships.94  It is here that 
the netizens continue to explore this electronic frontier living by 
rough consensus and running code.95  Indeed, it is a global social 
system of coexistence and interactions.96 
The democratic ideals of cyber-communities are directly 
related to the realities of the legal order of the Internet.  Without a 
doubt, open cyber-communities are likely to be extremely diverse, 
and it is within their own inner workings that the management of 
the Internet takes center stage.97  The fact is that short of 
disconnecting a nation completely from the Internet, all other 
measures would fail to achieve an over-all defense without 
sacrificing the technological benefits owed to the people of the 
nation.   
Yet, what is the purpose of any defensive policy?  Should this 
policy be one where the nation-state agrees to subscribe to 
recognized precepts of international law, but later disregard them 
when faced with having to adjust its domestic law to be consistent 
with international law?  The answer should be that any policy of 
national cybersecurity that claims legitimacy must first subscribe 
to international human rights standards, which possess a global 
quality empowered by natural law as the foundation of the human 
trait that continues to give international law its direct connection to 
the well-being of both the human person and the nation-state.98  It 
is not surprising then that legitimacy is inextricably linked with 
power.99   
For the nation-state, legitimacy is based on a system of 
asymmetric power, in which “the actions of those who rule are 
accepted voluntarily by those who are ruled because the latter are 
convinced that the actions of the former conform to pre-established 
 
 94 Hans Klein, The Right to Political Participation and the Information Society, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 190 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed., 
2006). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 340 (2000). 
 98 See GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 53. 
 99 M. Patrick Cottrell, Hope or Hype? Legitimacy and US Leadership in a Global Age, 
7 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 339 (2011). 
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norms.”100  Although it would be quite easy to visualize the 
Internet as a chaotic environment replete with visions of vandals 
and pirates, the truth is that the Internet is not as chaotic or as 
critically lawless as these visions would suggest.  The impression 
that the threat to the nation-state is centralized in cyber-attacks is a 
fiction.  The truth is that it is unscrupulous individuals serving their 
own interests that abuse the Internet and create the threats that 
need to be stopped.  The truth is that cyberspace continues to 
operate as expected, first as a source of information, and second as 
a potential promoter of human dignity.101  Cyberspace has its own 
set of rules and principles, in the majority of cases reflect the “real-
life” laws.  This phenomenon helps it to keep its integrity and 
coherence, although real-world rules often show to be insufficient, 
when confronted with the challenges posed by cyberspace.  The 
majority of those challenges reflects the global system of human 
rights and underlines the urgent need for their efficient 
protection.102 
The idea of the netizen is a direct consequence of the very 
nature of cyberspace.  The Internet, being a network of peers, runs 
based on equal participation of all stakeholders.103  This basic 
truth, recognized by the WSIS within its 2003 Declaration of 
Principles (item 17) is known at the principle of 
multistakeholderism.104  WSIS defined it by confirming that 
“building an inclusive Information Society requires new forms of 
solidarity, partnership and cooperation among governments and 
other stakeholders (i.e., the private sector) civil society and 
international organizations.”105  Deriving from the WSIS 
declaration, the 2005 WSIS Tunis Agenda sets the stage for the 
creation of the Internet Governance Forum as “a new forum for 
 
 100 Id. at 339–40. 
 101 Report on Internet Freedom, supra note 66. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See About the Internet Governance Forum, INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM, 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/aboutigf (last visited April 16, 2013). 
 104 WSIS, Geneva 2003, Declaration of Principles, U.N. Doc. WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/ 
geneva/official/dop.html. 
 105 Id. 
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multi-stakeholder policy dialogue.”106  Today the principle of 
multistakeholderism may be defined as an equal involvement of all 
groups participating in the Internet’s evolution: state authorities 
(whether acting directly or through intergovernmental 
organizations), individuals or organizations acting on behalf of the 
civil society, and last but not least the business sector (including 
not only the ICT sector but any other market segment).107  The 
multi-stakeholder character of Internet governance makes it unique 
in the world of international relations.  This basic characteristic 
determines any possible corresponding legal regulation.  In the IG 
field it is no longer governments alone that have to come to a 
consensus.  It is the nation-state engendered with authority, but 
tempered by responsibility, that must apply that authority holding 
in mind the best interests of humanity and without resort to any use 
of coercion.108 
Multi-stakeholderism necessitates the re-composition of the 
stakeholders involved in the global consensus-seeking processes.  
Territoriality is no longer an issue nor can it serve as criteria for 
the composition of such stakeholder groups, unlike a shared 
opinion or agenda.109  Cyberspace also allows for more versatile 
but equal participation.  In the “real-world,” two citizenships held 
simultaneously are usually considered more than enough, while in 
cyberspace the common standard is for all “netizens” to participate 
in numerous communities at the same time, fluctuating among and 
between them.  Therefore, the nature of the cyber-realm is far 
different in its composition and governance regime than the 
traditional, historic political world-order decided upon in 1648. 
The concept of replacing the global cyberspace with a web of 
small, well-guarded national networks seems appealing for a 
number of reasons.  Not only might it enable more security, but it 
 
 106 WSIS, Tunis 2005, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, U.N. Doc. WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E, item 72 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/ 
wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html. 
 107 The Tunis Agenda introduced the concept of the multi-stakeholder process as the 
future standard for Internet governance. 
 108 See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society 
1245 (1992). 
 109 See supra note 78. 
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could also enable the more efficient enforcement of human rights.  
Human rights such as freedom of speech or privacy, although 
enshrined in numerous international documents and clarified in 
court decisions, still differ in application at the national legislative 
and judicial level.  Ineffective international privacy protection, 
resulting from divergent interpretations of the content of the 
privacy right in various legal systems, points to the need to 
intensify international collaboration in times of global electronic 
exchange, which continuously expose new risks to privacy.  
Making cyberspace just one more element of national territory, 
guarded with (electronic) frontiers would allow exercise of those 
national human rights standards efficiently, and solve the growing 
problem of finding a global standard for free speech or online 
privacy.  The challenge of successfully protecting individual 
privacy might serve to demonstrate the shortcoming of the cyber-
Westphalian order. 
The problem with privacy protection online is twofold.  First, 
there is the abovementioned lack of a universal accord on the 
status of personal data protection.  Since the scope of the right to 
privacy is primarily shaped by the acknowledged scope of 
protected personal data, the diverse status of privacy regimes in 
various jurisdictions leads to the actual ineffectiveness of any 
national or international personal data protection online because it 
may not be effectively exercised.110  The second problem with 
protecting privacy online is the very definition of “privacy.”  Even 
the EU states, proud of their human right protection regime, find it 
difficult to define the scope of privacy protection when faced with 
such new challenges as the legal status of data presented by 
Google Street View or other geolocation data111 and Google’s 
possible legal responsibility in Europe for infringing users’ 
privacy. 
Introducing national, territorial jurisdiction over particular 
“spaces” in cyberspace would not only help solve those difficult 
 
 110 See generally, Frank La Rue, supra note 66. 
 111 See Data Protection Working Party, Article 29: Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation 
Services on Smart Mobile Devices, 881/11/EN WP 185 (May 16, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2011/wp185_en.pdf 
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problems, but would also make the work of ISPs much easier.  
They would no longer have to make difficult decisions on their 
own company standards for protecting privacy of their users at a 
“sufficient” (from a legal and moral point of view, in the global 
context) level.  All they would have to do would be to meet the 
national standards in “national” networks, a challenge international 
companies have successfully faced for decades in the “real” world, 
operating in multiple state territories through their branch offices. 
What is wrong with this—optimistic, as it might seem—
scenario? Cyber-balkanization is a term used to describe the 
process of the global network falling into a set of smaller, 
community-based groups of users.  The Westphalian order for 
cyberspace proposes to make this process the official practice.  The 
Westphalian order for cyberspace represents a point in Internet 
history of losing the freedom and interoperability of the 
information exchange, while gaining security of individual users—
one granted by national laws of the state of their residence.  
National authorities would have the tools to effectively protect 
their residents’ rights (e.g., privacy), but those residents would lose 
most of their freedom within the process.   
What is however most problematic is that under a Westphalian 
regime the network would lose its interoperability.  In the 
Westphalian cyber-world there no longer is a global “cloud” of 
information, only separate spaces guarded with electronic tools and 
governed by national laws.  They are connected through narrow, 
scrupulously controlled “gates,” where exchange of information 
takes place, just as is the case with traditional borders or postal 
packages today.  The cyber-Westphalian era would take us back to 
a seventeenth century Internet.  It would strip us of the very value 
of the information society we are now trying to protect, since there 
would no longer be a global space for intellectual exchange, 
despite allegedly offering a sense of security.  Benjamin Franklin’s 
thought rings true once more: “The man who trades freedom for 
security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either.”112  
Should we give up the potential for free thought that the global 
 
 112 Quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK (1738). 
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information society provides us for a false pretense of “national” 
security, we are actually bound to lose both. 
IV. A RECOMMENDATION: JUS INTERNET—THE JUS GENTIUM FOR 
CYBERSPACE 
The assertion that territorial law does not fit the transnational 
nature of cyberspace is not new.  In 1996, D. R. Johnson and D. G. 
Post stated that as a fact, traditional jurisdiction and democracy are 
not fit for regulating cyberspace.113  They accurately noted that the 
Internet “radically subverts a system of rule-making based on 
borders between physical spaces, at least with respect to the claim 
that cyberspace should naturally be governed by territorially 
defined rules.”114  With their controversial observation they added 
to the rising wave of cyberspace law criticism.115  Not discouraged, 
they amended their concept in a 1998 follow-up entitles “The New 
‘Civic Virtue’ of the Internet.”116  They described a detailed 
proposal for governing the ungovernable—a deeply democratic 
“Complex Systems Model for the Governance of Cyberspace” 
based on a common “civic virtue,”117 instead of using statutory law 
and territorial state jurisdiction for governing the transboundary 
and international cyberspace.118  The model rose to the challenge 
posed by cyberspace by offering a new, tailor-made regulatory 
solution rather than an analogy-based application of traditional 
laws.119 
 
 113 See generally supra note 18. 
 114 Id. at 1370. 
 115 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207, 207–08 (1996). 
 116 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The New “Civic Virtue” of the Internet; A 
Complex Systems Model for the Governance of Cyberspace, in THE EMERGING INTERNET 
(C. Firestone ed., 1998), available at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/ 
Newcivicvirtue.html. 
 117 Id.  They derive their concept from the idea of “civic virtue” underlying 
representative democracy.  Paraphrasing Jeffrey Abramson, the authors conclude that the 
core of civic virtue is the ennobling of men and women, when included in democratic 
processes.  Those men and women “(whether acting as voters or representatives) are . . . 
casting aside narrow, selfish, or factional interests and putting themselves in the special 
frame of mind known as ‘good citizenship.’” Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
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Post and Johnson identified particular principles reflected in all 
online communities and recognized the legal and practical meaning 
of electronic (rather than physical) boundaries.120  This combined 
legal and practical approach could help identify and separately 
govern “areas” of cyberspace.  Such areas, “occupied” by cyber-
communities, understood as groups of Internet users sharing 
common ethical standards, would resemble traditional societies in 
cyberspace.121  Rather than seeking a universal compromise for a 
statutory law consensus, the authors offered “a form of civic virtue 
that can tolerate continuous conflict and can reside in the very 
architecture of a decentralized, diverse, complex adaptive 
system.”122  Values common to all the communities would 
constitute a narrow catalog of globally shared principles, created 
“from the bottom up.”123  Community members would be bound 
by the values shared by the individual online communities they 
decide to join, just as residents are obliged to respect the national 
laws of their countries of residence upon crossing a border.124  
Rules shared by all of the communities would then allow 
identification of a narrow set of characteristics defining the “civic 
virtue.” Such set of standards, based on practical and applicable 
consensus, would be the foundation for online governance. 
Critics, however, blamed the authors for lacking a sense of 
reality.125  Post and Johnson argued that the system would work 
based solely on the internalization and legitimization of the values 
enshrined within the civic virtue.126  They argued that once the 
governed accepted the values as their own (internalized them) and 
recognized them as law that rightfully could be enforced in the 
name of the community (legitimized them) the system would 
work.127  The critics claimed there was no power, authority or 
motivation to safeguard the execution of these ethical principles, 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 E.g., A. L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 709 (1998). 
 126 See Johnson & Post, supra note 116. 
 127 Id. 
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and therefore no possibility to raise them to the level of an 
efficiently working legal system.128 
It would be difficult, one might admit, to conceive of online 
communities that could be governed by individuals so morally 
stringent as not to give into the temptations authority brings.129  
And the civic virtue concept partook of one crucial flaw—it was 
against the egotistic human nature.  However, time brought a 
practical solution to this crucial challenge: the future brought the 
“hybrid economy.”  This concept is discussed in detail by 
Lawrence Lessig in his latest book, Remix (with a revealing 
subtitle: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy),130 and by Benkler131 in Wealth of Networks.132  Lessig 
argues that the hybrid economy is the economic model best suited 
to reflect current trends in global online interaction.133  According 
to him, a hybrid economy combines elements of two well-
established economic models: the commercial economy, which 
conceives of the value of goods or services only in terms of 
money, and the sharing economy, exemplified by love or 
friendship, invaluable in hard currency.134  The originally 
dichotomous classification, where an individual relationship would 
be either commercial or sharing, was severely disrupted by the 
activities “netizens” undertook.135  Online communities organized 
in ways completely foreign to the off-line reality.136  Netizens 
“shared” their free time, knowledge, ideas, offered each other 
 
 128 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200 
(1998). 
 129 See KATHY BOWREY, LAW AND INTERNET CULTURES 24–31 (2005) (discussing the 
“mapping” of cybercommunities); cf. ROLF H. WEBER ET AL., SHAPING INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 22 (Springer 2010) (pointing to the problem of “free riders” not ready and 
unwilling to collaborate on equal basis within the egalitarian society). 
 130 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY (2008). 
 131 Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 341 (2004). 
 132 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006). 
 133 LESSIG, supra note 130, at 248–49, 294. 
 134 Id. at 118. 
 135 See id. at 177–85. 
 136 See id. at 225–26. 
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companionship and support—free of charge.137  However, as time 
proved and experience showed, such free sharing also brought 
tremendous commercial success.  Wikipedia and Linux, for 
example, were initiated by few enthusiasts with some free time and 
now are flourishing enterprises operating on hard currency.  That’s 
how a hybrid economy works.138  It combines the uncombinable—
what once was “sharing” could now be evaluated “commercially.” 
Benkler adds to this concept by redefining the role of price in a 
world ruled by a hybrid economy.139  In sharing economies price 
does not play any part—that role had to be adopted by a different 
feature.140  Deriving from his earlier work, in Wealth of 
Networks,141 Benkler envisioned a new phase in social evolution: 
the era of network information economy, based upon what he calls 
“peer production.”142 The concept covers generating new 
resources, ones not calculable with money.143  According to his 
diagnosis, peer production will soon rule world markets.144  
Benkler and Lessig argue that neither laws nor commercial barriers 
can halt this unfolding revolution.145  As Lessig rightfully points 
out, the “past survives only if it can beat out the future.”146  As he 
goes on to reassume, national authorities and certain professional 
lobbies clinging to outdated legal concepts cannot succeed.147  Not 
only because their demands are irrational, but mainly, because 
they’re not pragmatic.  Among those concepts, the reintroduction 
of territorial jurisdiction in cyberspace may be named.  A similar 
notion seems noticeable in the new mapping of cyberspace 
provided for by David Post in his latest work.148 
 
 137 See id. 
 138 See generally id. at 226–49. 
 139 Benkler, supra note 131, at 275–76. 
 140 See id. at 282. 
 141 BENKLER, supra note 132. 
 142 Benkler, supra note 131, at 330–31, 334. 
 143 BENKLER, supra note 132, at 115–16. 
 144 Id. at 131. 
 145 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 130 at 266–68 (discussing these limitations in 
copyright law). 
 146 Id. at 142. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE – NOTES ON THE STATE IN 
CYBERSPACE (2009). 
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Benkler rightfully points out that the goal of a contemporary 
government is to assess the needs of and values crucial to its 
community.149  Since that community is reaching beyond state 
borders, corresponding solutions must be sought.  In times of 
economic and cultural globalization it is necessary to look for 
global solutions, and one might be offered by looking into the 
ancient concept of universal jus naturale.  It was thought of as 
combining rules and values recognized throughout all 
communities.150  Benkler sees the era of globalization and peer 
production as a unique opportunity to reassess the values 
universally recognized.151  This implication may be considered a 
reference to the turning point in international law history.  As 
already mentioned, a hybrid economy covers both commercial and 
sharing economies.  A mechanism best suited for governing it 
ought therefore to derive from two sets of values, specific to each 
of them respectively.  Statutory law governs monetary exchange in 
commercial economies, while ethics and codes of conduct allow 
for the even operation of sharing economies.  Since a hybrid 
economy comprises both, commercial and free, therefore both law 
and ethics respectively must be considered when drafting a 
regulatory standard for the hybrid economy in cyberspace.  Jus 
Internet is just that proposal, realistically combining both the areas. 
Jus Internet derives from Roman jus gentium, built upon values 
recognized by all people, originating from natural law (jus 
naturale).152  Created as a fundamental framework, jus gentium 
was designed to govern interactions among and between 
individuals from numerous diverse provinces of the Roman 
Empire.153  All inhabitants of the Roman Empire—much like all 
 
 149 See generally BENKLER, supra note 132. 
 150 See, e.g., A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW: MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 560 
(1978); Brian Tierney, Vitoria and Suarez on Ius Gentium, Natural Law, and Custom, in 
THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 110–16 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B. 
Murphy eds., 2007). 
 151 See Benkler, supra note 131, at 328. 
 152 Kokott & Hoffmeister, supra note 12, ¶ 2. 
 153 The principles of jus gentium were applied to relations between foreigners (ones not 
holding Roman citizenship) and Roman citizens.  Roman citizens’ interactions were 
regulated by the statutory law—jus civile. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of 
Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 69, 
74–75 (1998); see also Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, International Law, Human 
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netizens—came from different cultural and historical 
backgrounds.154  They had to coincide while entering economic 
transactions or otherwise interacting.  Jus gentium served as a 
basic set of references for settling disputes arising out of such 
interactions.155  The system relied on a basic, humane sense of 
justice and fairness.156  Its theory derived from two values: trust 
(fides) and equity (aequitas).157  When identifying particular norms 
two regulatory systems were evoked: jus naturale and religious 
law.158  Initially jus gentium operated as a common custom, 
eventually taking on the role of binding customary law.159  The 
general character of its norms and its versatile application brought 
it authority among various cultures and social systems.160  
Although the Roman Empire failed, jus gentium survived and 
evolved into the law of nations, known today as public 
international law.161 
The jus gentium lesson may well be used for regulating the 
universal and heterogeneous cyberspace.  One would need to start 
by identifying the principles recognized as common to all the 
 
Rights, and Latcrit Theory: Civil and Political Rights—An Introduction, 28 U. Miami 
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 223, 227 n.17 (1997). 
 154 Frederick Bird, Moral Universals as Cultural Realities, in ETHICAL UNIVERSALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 97, 110 (F. Neil Brady ed., Springer-Verlag 1996). 
 155 See Heinrich Rommen, DIE STAATSLEHRE DES FRANZ SUAREZ S.J. 275 (1926); 
DYSON & STIRK, supra note 11, at 127–30. 
 156 See DYSON & STIRK, supra note 11, at 130. 
 157 See Martin Josef Schermaier, Bona Fides of Roman Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH IN 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 63, 77 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 
2000); DYSON & STIRK, supra note 11, at 130–31; 1 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 119–20 (MacMillan 
& Co. 1911). 
 158 See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, 
NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW 25–30, 51–55 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 
2001). 
 159 See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, FOUNDER OF THE MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, 
FOUNDER OF THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE 
LAW OF NATIONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND A JUSTIFIED APPRECIATION 157–60 
(1934). 
 160 See id. 
 161 On the evolution of jus gentium, see generally EHRLICH, supra note 79.  On the jus 
naturale genesis, see generally LACHS, supra note 79, at 39–44; Goldie, supra note 79, at 
569–86; Belch, supra note 79, at 225–27. 
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governed.  Present day deliberations on what’s fair and just, once 
upon a time the exclusive domain of religious law, are left to 
ethics.162  Just as religious law was used to ascertain the contents 
of jus naturale, nowadays the very same set of values is the subject 
of the global human rights dispute, with the UDHR representing 
the current compromise on their scope.163  An analysis of the rules 
and principles recognized by numerous multinational and 
multistakeholder cyber-communities could efficiently stimulate 
this difficult debate, taking the universal consensus embodied in 
the UDHR as its starting point.  By identifying universal ethical 
standards and particularities unique to the cyber realm and 
common to all (cyber-) communities, a global consensus could be 
reached.  This basic ethical standard could be considered a 
reflection of what Post and Johnson once called “civic virtue.”  
With the development of a hybrid economy, the civic virtue 
concept would no longer seem utopian.  Rather, the common goal, 
strived for by all the governed, would be that of the profits of peer 
production, whether monetary or not expressible through price.  A 
practical example would be the current rivalry between Facebook 
and Google+, focused on attempting to attract forever more users 
with user-friendly privacy policies, regardless of the fact that the 
existing international privacy laws decrease economic efficiency. 
A customary regulation for cyberspace could follow the trail 
set by the Roman jus gentium.  Once a set of general principles 
was identified as having community acceptance and being obeyed 
as a common custom, it could be raised to the status of customary 
law, having legally binding power.164  The crucial challenge to 
overcome would be rising to the multistakeholder model of 
Internet governance.  International customary law would prove to 
be insufficient, as it binds only one of the three crucial groups of 
stakeholders shaping the way the Internet is governed: customary 
law would bind only governments as international law subjects, 
 
 162 See Jochen von Bernstorff & Ingo Venzke, Ethos, Ethics, and Morality in 
International Relations, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
¶ 1, ¶ 4 (Heidelberg and Oxford Univ. Press 2013). 
 163 See generally OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 164 See N. Sea Cont’l Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
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disregarding business and the information society of users.  
Therefore the concept of jus Internet differs substantively from 
international customary law in one crucial aspect.  According to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international 
custom is defined as “evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”165  Therefore international customary law requires two 
elements to coexist.  First there must be an international custom 
(Latin: “usus”), which describes the existence of a uniform practice 
of state authorities.  For an international custom to become 
customary law, that practice must be accompanied by a conviction 
on the behalf of state authorities that the particular behavior—one 
depicted in the customary practice—is recognized by other states 
as possessing the force of law, an element described by the Latin 
term of “opinio iuris.”166  The current definition of international 
customary law leaves no room for considering the practice of 
individuals or non-state entities (such as Internet service providers) 
as constitutive of an international customary norm.  What is 
required to assess the evolution of a customary practice is the 
activity on behalf of state authorities, including its executive, 
legislative or judicial organs.  What is more, the “opinio iuris” 
element is assessed based on decisions of international courts, 
supported by the opinions of renowned legal scholars.167  Also, this 
prerequisite is impossible to meet for common practice of cyber-
communities. 
For example, although few national court decisions may be 
identified when it comes to Creative Commons (“CC”) licenses,168 
raising those national judicial examples to the rank of a possible 
international compromise on the copyright challenge in cyberspace 
 
 165 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/ 
index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. 
 166 See Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1997). 
 167 I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. 
 168 See, e.g., Lichôdmapwa v. L’asbl Festival de Theatre de Spa (Le Tribunal de 
Premiere Instance de Nivelles 2010) (Belg.), available at http://wiki.creativecommons. 
org/images/f/f6/2010-10-26_A%27cision-trib.-Nivelles-Lichodmapwa.pdf; Curry v. 
Audax (D. Ct. Amsterdam 2006), available at http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/ 
3/38/Curry-Audax-English.pdf; SGAE v. Fernández (Lower Ct. No. 6 Badajoz 2006) 
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would be too far-reaching.  For one, international courts dealing 
with public international law are not in the position to assess the 
compromise on copyright protection proposed within the private 
law CC licenses.  Therefore, the contemporary meaning of 
international customary law will not suffice to meet the needs of 
the global network of peers, as it does not include a mechanism to 
introduce the international peer-consensus into national legal 
systems.  At the same time, national legal systems may only be 
shaped through international law consensus.  The existing global 
consensus on forever more controversial ethical issues, reached 
within the fora of cyber-communities, must not be disregarded by 
the international community and ought to be introduced into the 
traditional international law system through soft-law instruments, 
such as recommendations or declarations, reflecting current 
developments.169  For instance, child pornography was declared 
undesirable by the majority of cyber-communities, and privacy 
policies were introduced by world’s largest ISPs in the absence of 
international consensus on the protection of personal data.  
Following this example, the international community should focus 
on identifying the consensus already achieved by cyber-
communities and encourage states to introduce harmonized 
national legislations envisaging that consensus, rather than 
supporting states in their efforts to enforce forever more stringent 
regulations, efforts contrary to the transboundary nature of 
cyberspace, such as the stupendous fiasco of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) treaty in Europe, 
opposed by netizens who took their online consensus onto the 
street of European capitals, cities and towns.170 
While the contemporary mechanism of customary law has little 
to offer the cyberspace dilemma, the Roman analogy does.  It 
offers a solution derived from individual practice and prospectively 
 
 169 See generally The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their 
Monitoring Bodies, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited 
May 13, 2013). 
 170 See Kevin Rawlinson, Controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
Proposals Rejected by European Parliament, INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2012), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/controversial-anticounterfeiting-trade-
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raises it to the rank of law, just as the Roman “ius” (as opposed to 
statutory “lex”)171 offered the possible codification of a custom 
exercised in private (peer-to-peer) relations.  Mid-twentieth century 
scholarship identified the trend described above as “applied 
jurisprudence.”  Instead of introducing elaborate legal theories into 
regulatory acts and futilely attempting to execute them, Professor 
Sidney Post Simpson and Ruth Field proposed basing legal 
regulation on a thorough case-law study.172  Recognizing the 
shortcoming of the argument that law enforcement is the sole 
explanation for why rules are obeyed and learning which methods 
worked best, they argued, would allow communities to propose 
more effective laws.173 
The global challenges posed by transboundary and 
transnational cyberspace, reflecting all the dogmatic differences in 
national jurisprudence, make any dogmatic consensus 
unachievable.  It is only through a thorough analysis of the status 
quo and a practical approach to problem solving that the current 
gridlock in Internet regulation may be solved.  One of the most 
important considerations is the recognition of individuals and 
corporations as particular groups subject to international law with 
legal personality and limited yet existent authority to invoke the 
responsibility of other subjects of international law in the realm of 
human rights.174  Any model proposed for the management of the 
Internet must acknowledge, for example, that civil society and 
businesses have made valuable contributions to the debate and 
require a share in the decision-making process.  This is the true 
essence of an efficient model for the management of the Internet. 
Cyberspace has shown that the traditional pattern of 
international lawmaking no longer suffices.  Traditional diplomatic 
tools for settling international law challenges are too slow to meet 
 
 171 See, e.g., Franz Wieacker, Ius Civile und Lex Publica in der Römischen Frühzeit, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HEINZ HÜBNER 357–76 (Heinz Hübner & Gottfried Baumgärtel eds., 
Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1984). 
 172 See Sidney Post Simpson & Ruth Field, Social Engineering Through Law: The Need 
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 173 See id. at 162. 
 174 See Alain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International Law, in THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 5–7 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Simon 
Olleson eds., 2010). 
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the demands of the age of cyberspace.  At the same time, an 
international diplomatic consensus is not sufficient in the 
multistakeholder era of Internet governance.  A new approach is 
needed.  According to the jus Internet concept, the role of the 
national lawmaker would be limited to amending national 
regulations according to the consensus identified in international 
fora—to recognize, that is, the elements of international common 
practice as fitting with national laws.   
The question of a forum appropriate for such consensus-
seeking on standards common to all cyberspace remains open, 
although numerous options may be used: from the IGF, through 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ITU, to the U.N. 
International Law Commission deliberating a set of Draft Articles 
on International Internet Law.  The growing global trend of 
increasing involvement and influence of non-state actors on global 
politics is nowhere more blatant than in cyberspace.175  Therefore 
the international community has no choice but to find a solution 
enabling non-state actors to join the negotiating table.  While the 
role of nation-states would be to introduce appropriate national 
laws, non-state actors would take it upon themselves to introduce 
the resulting consensus through their terms of service or rules of 
conduct, enforced through declining to render their services to or 
blocking the IP addresses of notorious violators.  The question of 
an appropriate consensus-seeking mechanism also remains open.  
One could opt for the traditional diplomatic tools, but for the 
reasons named above, one could also seek new democratic 
decision-making models.  As already mentioned, without a doubt 
all known soft-law instruments should come into play.  Deriving 
from the successful model of the large online community that is 
Wikipedia, Zittrain proposes a model of democracy altered to meet 
the particulars of cyber-communities—a “semiotic democracy.”176  
It does not operate based on a simple majority of votes, but as a 
more elaborate scheme it values decisions based on the strongest, 
 
 175 CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN LAW, 
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most convincing arguments.177  Arguments recognized and 
supported by the majority of the community should be 
acknowledged as the new community standards.178 
Jus Internet offers an alternative to international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.  International law 
in its present shape is non-binding to non-state actors.  Introducing 
a system flexible enough to include willing participants from 
outside governmental circles would be to envision and to 
encourage the multistakeholder nature of the IG community.  It 
would open up the possibility of introducing regulations directly 
within company terms of service or community internal rules.  
Rules constitutive of jus Internet would reflect the existing 
consensus among communities, both off and online. 
Why should jus Internet work?  For the same reason public 
international law does.  It originates from a strong customary 
background (e.g., the evolution of the law of the sea or the law of 
treaties).179  What is now a self-contained regime was once a 
diversified set of principles applied by sailors or diplomats 
respectively in their everyday endeavors.  There are few theories as 
to why international law works.  The prevailing one is quite 
simple: states observe international law because it pays off.  Pacta 
sunt servanda, a principle fundamental to international law, 
encourages states to respect their obligations toward one another 
because that they can reasonably expect the same in return, 
granting the foreseeability of the other states’ actions.180  The same 
mechanism may be used for the global cyberspace.  Trans-
boundary communities and international companies have proven 
the common interest concept true online.181  Wikipedia or Linux 
developers play by the community rules not in fear of sanctions but 
because of a chance to participate in something bigger.  Their 
power is that of the group, while for that group to have this power, 
it needs to operate smoothly.  That is achievable solely through 
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 179 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1961). 
 180 See, e.g., Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 Am. J. Int’l L. 775 (1959). 
 181 Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 176, at 141. 
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setting solid foundations for collaboration: that means setting clear 
rules, principles and procedures.  Just as is the case with 
international law, the process of setting such rules and procedures 
is never finished, but the more complete it is, the stronger the 
community. 
Jus Internet includes two crucial elements of the global hybrid 
economy.  It begins as a soft law proposal, operating on universal 
ethical standards common to netizens worldwide.  Through judicial 
recognition as a part of codes of professional conduct or good will, 
it evolves into a legal model fit to meet the economic challenges 
inherent in peer-production.  It offers the flexibility of ethical rules 
developed in a democratic process, built upon the “civic virtue” 
proposed by Post and Johnson.  Yet it also reflects the needs of the 
commercial economy, providing a perspective of statutory law 
regulation—it could serve as the stepping-stone for a treaty-based 
regulation of cyberspace.  The customary rules identified within 
jus Internet might serve as an element for building an Internet 
Framework Convention, putting cyberspace next to the open sea, 
outer space or natural environment—all initially regulated by 
international custom, and presently through self-contained treaty-
based regimes.  Thus, the community-based standard of jus 
gentium seems better fit to regulate the multi-national cyber-
society than the nation-based Westphalian order.  Even though the 
history of state sovereignty highlights the importance of nation-
states as major global players, the Internet Governance rule182  and 
international Internet law principle183 of multistakeholderism 
renders it ill-suited for cyberspace regulation. 
A global consensus on human rights is the contemporary core 
of jus naturale.  UDHR is the stepping-stone for seeking this 
consensus.  What is needed now are a thorough analysis of the 
human rights catalogue in its present state in light of cyber-
activities currently practiced online, as well as a proposal of its 
possible application to netizens.  Such efforts can be successfully 
 
 182 See WSIS, supra note 106. 
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made by both the United Nations and NGOs.184  The role of 
national authorities and governments would be to use their power 
to support the new (altered) protection standards.  The analysis of 
the human rights catalogue online should be conducted by 
professionals with experience in the field—both legal and 
technical.  The work provided by the United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) or the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea might serve as a good example 
of such a wide, multifaceted cooperation.  At the same time, it is 
the role of the human rights organizations to actively participate in 
the debate and raise the awareness of governments and individuals 
on this crucial issue as soon as possible, and to use their experience 
to support the negotiating parties in the collaboration of drafting - a 
Human Rights On-Line Framework Convention. 
CONCLUSION 
The Westphalian order is ill-fitted for the cyberspace 
environment, given that this vast frontier is composed of peers, 
physically located within all geographical locations 
simultaneously, rather than a group of individuals (citizens), 
physically located within nation states.  Therefore a sensible way 
of delimiting cyberspace—thus regulating and securing it—would 
be through its communities.185  Current developments demonstrate 
that law, as a tool used by states to regulate individual behaviors, 
proves forever less competent to regulate online activities.  Cyber 
communities successfully shape their internal relations with non-
legal tools, such as codes of ethics, terms of use, and self-
regulation.186 
 
 184 See Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, supra note 63 (outlining the body’s approach 
to promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet); Internet Rights 
and Principles Charter, INTERNET RIGHTS & PRINCIPLES COALITION, 
http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/wpcharter/ (last visited May 13, 2013) 
(demonstrating the successful efforts of the Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic 
Coalition with its Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet and related 10 
Rights and Principles for Internet Governance). 
 185 See generally THE CYBERCULTURES READER (David Bell & Barbara M. Kennedy 
eds., 2000). 
 186 See, e.g., Paul Hoffman, The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, IETF, http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) 
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The Internet as a community should be governed in light of a 
human dignity that appreciates the sum of all humanity and allows 
all to enjoy the wealth available to everyone.187  Such a scenario 
ought not to be deemed a utopian one.  The global cooperation 
achieved through pacific means is the leitmotif of Henry 
Kissinger’s recent book.188  In On China, he begins with a 
stunningly simple yet true recognition that neither of the 
contemporary (neither the U.S. nor China) superpowers are nation 
states.189  They are conglomerates of multiple communities, 
nations, cultures, and values.190  Yet it is through cooperation 
where possible and the continuous search of compromise that they 
manage to achieve world leadership.191  Kissinger, an experienced 
and supreme diplomat, saw the future of international development 
not in the military confrontation of superpowers (as history 
witnessed on numerous occasions), but in a “Pacific 
Community”—an economic and political cooperation between the 
United States and China.192  The pursuit of a compromise, 
intensified through commercial and economic competition, 
exchange of ideas and favors, will prove beneficial to both and will 
lead to a harmonization of joint values.193  It is not through 
economic or political sanctions, nor through humanitarian 
interventions, that human rights recognition will be enforced 
worldwide.  It is rather through dialogue and compromise.  
According to Kissinger, direct pressure on human rights issues 
 
(showing important elements that could be incorporated into a future overall model of 
Internet governance).  Although not suggested as an overall model for Internet 
governance, Avri Doria tapped into her expertise and knowledge to remind us of these 
guidelines.  (Avri Doria was a member of the Working Group on Internet Governance, a 
civil society participant in the WSIS and was a Non-Commercial appointee to 
the GNSO council within ICANN.  She served as chair of the GNSO council from 2007–
2009.) See Avri Doria, The IETF as a model for the IGF, INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
FORUM, http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions/IETF-as-model.pdf (last visited Apr. 
16, 2013). 
 187 See Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 2, at 576. 
 188 See HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 527 (2011). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
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ought to be replaced with economic cooperation and subtle 
molding of Chinese policy.194 
The hope of achieving a global common ground for human 
rights was also expressed by Rosalyn Higgins, the former President 
of the International Court of Justice.195  Establishing the core of 
such a compromise may be done solely through an analysis of 
values common to the whole global community represented in 
modern-day cyberspace.196  “Arguments about human uniqueness 
based on what computers can’t do leave us vulnerable to technical 
progress and what clever engineers might come up with.”197  The 
true source of success lies on a borderless Internet where “the sum 
of all its parts” brings about valuable outcomes.  The efforts of the 
Global Network Initiative show that the community no longer 
looks to states as the only capable and authorized entities to 
regulate the cyberspace and protect citizens.198   
What is more, recent events in North Africa proved that 
cyberspace is an efficient tool to oppose state authorities, should 
individuals represented within cyber communities, find state 
actions too oppressive.199  Therefore, aware of it or not, cyber 
communities (with or without the encouragement of governments) 
are defining the current shape of the human rights catalogue on 
their own.  The existing international law regime obliges every 
nation state to promote and respect the observance of human rights 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 Rosalyn Higgins, Former President, International Court of Justice, speech presented 
at the American Association of International Law on International Law and the Human 
Condition (March 5, 2010), available at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xhv1lr_ 
rosalyn-higgins-on-international-law-and-the-human-condition_lifestyle. 
 196 First steps towards achieving that goal are being taken by different community 
groups.  A recent example of a successful global cooperation would be that of the RIPE 
NCC community self-regulation done in cooperation with governments and enforcement 
agents. See Wout de Natris, Internet and Self-Governance? An Example, CIRCLEID (Sep. 
13, 2011, 10:28 AM PDT), http://www.circleid.com/posts/internet_and_self_ 
governance_an_example. 
 197 SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 283 (20th 
ed. 2005). 
 198 See generally GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative. 
org (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 199 See, e.g., Bianca Bosker, Despite Social Media Block, “Egypt” Surges On Twitter, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/ 
31/twitter-egypt-protests_n_816542.html. 
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and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter.  The aforementioned Human Rights Council resolution on 
freedom of expression (2009) (A/HRC/12/16) obliges states to 
respect the freedom of expression also when exercised through 
ICTs.200  Recognizing the “importance of all forms of the media, 
including . . . the Internet,” the resolution recognizes the rights 
enshrined in the ICCPR, including “the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds . . . through any other media of 
their choice.”201 
The current challenge of the international community is to 
identify the contents of human rights catalogue, and in particular 
the right to free speech, online.  That challenge may be well-faced 
when the mechanism described as jus Internet is deployed.  There 
is no doubt that it is the duty of all law-abiding nation states of our 
planet to avoid spreading fears in the name of righteousness.  The 
application of a territorial legal instrument to assess the limits of 
human rights online (as pertaining to the Westphalian order) is 
bound to defeat the idea crucial not only to the composition of the 
global human rights catalogue, but also to the global network.  In 
the end, the defense of human rights is not for the timid. 
 
 
 200 Human Rights Council Res. 12/16, supra note 58. 
 201 Id. at 2. 
